Bharat And Central Asian Republics – Continuum of Allyship and Camaraderie
Bharat and Central Asian Republics not only share a strong foundational ground based on historic trade and cultural ties but also are seen as a time-tested allyship in the continuum of evolving geopolitics with each passing decade. Rooted form the rich historical narrative of the Silk Route economic nodes, facilitating trade of precious metals and stones like Lapis Lazuli, Gold, Silver, among others, both the subcontinents also were active destinations for travelers and historians, thereby intertwined with a thread of common heritage and a resonating historical narrative.
Bharat’s relations with the five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) reflect a longstanding strategic alignment rooted in ancient cultural ties and current geopolitical interests. Today, this partnership combines civilizational connections with practical cooperation on energy, connectivity, and security, particularly as regional dynamics shift around China, Russia, and Afghanistan.
Historical and civilizational connection
For over two millennia, the Indo‑Central Asian space was tied together through the Silk Route, facilitating the movement of traders, monks, scholars and ideas between the Gangetic plains and the Ferghana, Bukhara and Samarkand oases. Buddhism, Sanskrit learning, and later Indo‑Persian cultural forms travelled northward, while artistic, architectural and mercantile influences from Central Asia became integral to the subcontinent’s composite culture.
These links created a reservoir of familiarity and goodwill that modern diplomacy continues to draw upon, visible in the easy reception of Indian cinema, yoga, education and IT outreach in contemporary Central Asian societies. Cultural centres, ICCR scholarships, and regular cultural festivals have become deliberate tools to frame present‑day cooperation as a renewal of an older civilizational compact rather than a new geopolitical intrusion[1].
The Diplomatic Framework
Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1992, but political engagement gained significant momentum from the mid‑2010s, notably through high‑level visits to all five republics and the launch of the India–Central Asia Dialogue in 2019. The first stand‑alone India–Central Asia Summit in 2022 created a regular summit mechanism, a permanent secretariat in New Delhi, and agreed formats for meetings of foreign, trade, culture and national security officials[2].
These frameworks signal a transition from ad hoc bilateralism to structured minilateralism, where India and the CARs coordinate positions on Afghanistan, connectivity, trade facilitation and capacity‑building. The emphasis on consensus‑driven mechanisms, rather than alliance blocs, reflects a shared preference for strategic autonomy while building habits of consultation that underpin camaraderie[3].
Security and defence Cooperation
Shared concerns over terrorism, radicalisation, narcotics flows and instability emanating from Afghanistan have made security cooperation a central pillar of the relationship. Bharat has invested in training Central Asian armed forces, operating an airbase‑cum‑military hospital facility in Tajikistan, and undertaking joint exercises and counterterrorism training under both bilateral arrangements and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) framework[4].
Within the SCO, India and the CARs participate in “Peace Mission” and other exercises aimed at interoperability in counter‑insurgency and urban warfare, while Indian proposals for cybersecurity cooperation and terrorism databases indicate a move toward more institutionalised security architecture. At the same time, coordination on Afghanistan through dedicated joint working groups seeks to align their threat assessments and avoid the region becoming a theatre for proxy competition[5].
Energy security and economic interdependence
Central Asia’s hydrocarbon and uranium resources render the region critical to India’s long‑term energy diversification strategy. Kazakhstan has emerged as a key supplier of uranium, while projects such as the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, though delayed, remain emblematic of the ambition to anchor economic interdependence in energy corridors[6].
Trade volumes remain modest, constrained by geography and connectivity bottlenecks, yet there is growing interest in pharmaceuticals, IT, textiles, agro‑processing, and education services where India is competitive, and Central Asia seeks partners beyond its traditional economic interlocutors. Investment prospects in tourism, healthcare and sustainable development sectors show how economic ties are gradually broadening beyond commodity‑centric exchanges towards a more diversified partnership[7].
Connectivity, corridors and strategic geography
Given the absence of a direct land border, connectivity is the decisive variable in determining the depth of India–Central Asia engagement. India’s role in operationalising Iran’s Chabahar Port, participation in the International North‑South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and accession to the Ashgabat Agreement collectively aim to create multimodal routes linking Indian ports to Central Asian markets via Iran and the Caspian.
New Delhi emphasises “transparent, consultative and rule‑based” connectivity projects to distinguish its approach from more debt‑heavy infrastructure models, positioning Chabahar–INSTC as an alternative or complement to Chinese Belt and Road corridors. For the CARs, such diversification reduces over‑dependence on any single external actor and enhances their bargaining power in negotiating transit, tariffs and digital infrastructure[8].
Multivector foreign policies and great‑power competition
Central Asian states pursue “multi‑vector” diplomacy, balancing Russia’s security role, China’s economic heft, Western engagement, and rising actors like India and Türkiye. India’s late physical entry into the region is offset by normative and political advantages—being seen as a non‑revisionist, non‑hegemonic partner with a record of capacity‑building rather than regime‑change interventions[9].
At the same time, the asymmetry between Chinese and Indian footprints is stark: Beijing’s energy pipelines, infrastructure investments, and trade volumes far exceed India’s presence. This reality pushes India to leverage niches—digital public goods, human resource development, healthcare, education and defence training—where competitive advantages can translate into disproportionate goodwill and strategic influence.
Soft power, education and societal linkages
Soft power acts as the everyday language of camaraderie in this relationship. Indian films, music and television enjoy wide popularity, and yoga and Ayurveda have become soft connectors that sustain positive public perceptions of India. Government‑backed initiatives—cultural centres, International Day of Yoga events, and touring art troupes—embed this popular appeal in official cultural diplomacy.
On the education front, Central Asian students increasingly enrol in Indian universities, medicine and technical institutes, aided by scholarships and affordable costs. Alumni networks, joint research programmes and think‑tank dialogues are slowly transforming the relationship from an elite‑driven foreign policy agenda into a denser web of societal exchanges that can endure leadership changes[10].
Structural challenges and friction points
Despite the rhetoric of continuity, several structural impediments temper the pace of cooperation. Limited direct connectivity, complex transit through third countries, and sanctions‑related uncertainty around Iran complicate the commercial viability of many proposed corridors. Trade volumes remain far below potential, and private sector engagement from both sides is still cautious due to regulatory opacity and perceived political risks[11].
Moreover, India’s own bandwidth is stretched across the Indo‑Pacific, West Asia and immediate neighbourhood, occasionally resulting in episodic rather than sustained high‑level engagement. Central Asian elites also need to continuously reconcile their ties with India with simultaneous reliance on Russia’s security umbrella and China’s economic instruments, which can create subtle constraints on overt alignment with Indian positions[12].
Future trajectories of allyship and camaraderie
Going forward, the continuum of allyship is likely to deepen along certain functional axes rather than through formal alliance structures. Priority domains include counterterrorism and cybersecurity cooperation, where shared vulnerabilities and India’s technological capabilities align well with Central Asian needs. Climate‑resilient agriculture, water management, and renewable energy—particularly solar in arid regions—offer new arenas for developmental partnerships that frame India as a co‑problem‑solver rather than a traditional power‑political actor[13].
If connectivity initiatives via Chabahar, INSTC and associated rail‑road links can be pragmatically advanced, India–Central Asia relations may evolve from largely political‑symbolic camaraderie into a more material economic and strategic interdependence. In essence, the relationship is best read not as a sudden pivot, but as a layered process of reconnection where civilizational memory, shared security anxieties and a search for diversified partners collectively sustain a continuum of allyship suited to a multipolar Eurasian order.
Way Forward
Bharat–Central Asia relations thus represent a relationship of reconnection rather than reinvention—where historical familiarity is being recalibrated to meet contemporary strategic, economic and security imperatives. While structural constraints of geography and great-power competition limit the pace of engagement, the absence of hegemonic intent and the emphasis on capacity building give India a distinctive and credible presence in the region. As Eurasia moves towards a more fragmented yet multipolar order, the durability of this allyship will depend less on formal alignments and more on functional cooperation, reliable connectivity, and people-centric partnerships. If sustained with strategic patience and institutional depth, this continuum of camaraderie can evolve into a stable pillar of India’s extended neighbourhood diplomacy, contributing to both regional resilience and India’s long-term strategic autonomy.
[1] https://www.india-briefing.com/news/india-central-asia-summit-key-outcomes-security-trade-investment-24155.html/
[2] https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/decoding-the-rationale-behind-the-4th-india-central-asia-dialogue/
[3] https://www.pmfias.com/india-central-asia-relations/
[4] https://asthanawrites.org/2025/10/04/strengthening-military-and-security-cooperation-in-the-sco-an-indian-perspective/
[5] https://asthanawrites.org/2025/10/04/strengthening-military-and-security-cooperation-in-the-sco-an-indian-perspective/
[6] https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/comparing-chinese-and-indian-energy-security-strategies-in-central-asia/
[7] https://www.india-briefing.com/news/india-central-asia-summit-key-outcomes-security-trade-investment-24155.html/
[8] https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/comparing-chinese-and-indian-energy-security-strategies-in-central-asia/
[9] https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/08/11/india-central-asia/
[10] https://ccas.uok.edu.in/Files/93269b6c-7f53-4439-ae9a-3bdf55a4c649/Journal/b6474c0f-54f2-4913-a6a1-237e584d7b42.pdf
[11] https://ccas.uok.edu.in/Files/93269b6c-7f53-4439-ae9a-3bdf55a4c649/Journal/b6474c0f-54f2-4913-a6a1-237e584d7b42.pdf
[12] https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/decoding-the-rationale-behind-the-4th-india-central-asia-dialogue/